Stablecoins and New Settlement Networks

What the rise of A7A5 reveals about digital money, sanctions and parallel payment networks

Stablecoins are often discussed through the lens of faster payments, lower transaction costs and continuous settlement.

The latest developments around the ruble-backed A7A5 stablecoin introduce a very different dimension.

A7A5 was created as part of the A7 cross-border settlement infrastructure linked to Russia’s PSB. Its reported turnover has now approached $140 billion since launch, while the wider network serves thousands of businesses conducting international payments.

The scale is notable, but the more important point is what the system represents.

Stablecoins are no longer being used only to improve existing payment flows. In some markets, they are being used to create alternative settlement networks where access to traditional financial infrastructure has become restricted.

That changes the stablecoin discussion.

It connects digital money with sanctions, monetary sovereignty, correspondent banking and the growing fragmentation of global finance.

A payment rail can exist outside the banking corridor

Cross-border business payments have traditionally depended heavily on correspondent banking.

A company instructs its bank to make a payment. The transaction may move through one or several intermediary institutions before reaching the beneficiary bank. Compliance checks, correspondent relationships, currencies, cut-off times and access to clearing systems all influence whether the payment can be completed.

Stablecoins change part of that architecture.

Value can move between blockchain addresses without requiring every step of the transfer to pass through the traditional correspondent chain.

That does not make the banking system irrelevant. Fiat still needs to enter the structure somewhere. Reserves need to exist. Businesses ultimately need liquidity, accounting records and, in many cases, conversion back into conventional money.

But stablecoins can relocate where those dependencies sit.

Instead of requiring a banking relationship at every stage of a cross-border transaction, the critical points may become issuance, redemption, liquidity and the interfaces connecting on-chain value with national currencies.

That is an important structural change.

A7A5 illustrates the geopolitical use case

The A7A5 case is unusual because the objective is closely connected to the restrictions facing Russian international payments.

Reuters reports that the A7 infrastructure was created by PSB for cross-border settlements, with A7 previously saying that approximately 90% of its activity was with Asian countries, predominantly China.

The U.S. Treasury has described A7 as a cross-border settlement platform used for sanctions evasion. In August 2025, OFAC designated A7 and affiliated entities, along with Old Vector, the Kyrgyzstani company issuing A7A5. Treasury also described links between A7A5 and the sanctioned Garantex ecosystem.

This makes the case materially different from a regulated stablecoin being introduced for merchant checkout or corporate treasury.

But that difference is precisely why it matters.

It demonstrates that stablecoin technology is economically neutral in one important sense: the same characteristics that can improve ordinary settlement, including continuous availability, rapid transfer and reduced dependence on intermediary banks, can also make the technology attractive when traditional financial access is deliberately restricted.

The infrastructure does not determine the legality of the transaction.

The participants, counterparties, jurisdictions and purpose still do.

Sanctions do not disappear on-chain

One of the most misleading assumptions about blockchain settlement is that bypassing a correspondent bank somehow removes sanctions or compliance obligations.

It does not.

A blockchain may continue processing transactions regardless of banking hours or geographic borders, but businesses operate through legal entities. Stablecoins depend on issuers, reserve arrangements, exchanges, custodians, liquidity providers and redemption mechanisms.

Those points remain exposed to regulation.

In the A7 case, U.S. authorities targeted the companies and institutions supporting the ecosystem rather than relying on the assumption that the blockchain itself could simply be switched off.

This creates a more distributed compliance environment.

Risk may sit with:

• the stablecoin issuer;
• the institution holding or supporting the reserves;
• the exchange providing liquidity;
• the wallet or custody provider;
• the business sending or receiving the funds;
• intermediary conversion services;
• the banks providing fiat entry and exit;
• beneficial owners behind the counterparties.

A transaction can therefore be technically successful while creating serious legal or counterparty exposure.

Settlement finality is not the same as compliance finality.

The reserve still anchors the system

Stablecoins are often described as blockchain-native money, but fiat-backed tokens remain dependent on assets and institutions outside the blockchain.

A ruble stablecoin ultimately needs a credible relationship with ruble liquidity. A dollar stablecoin needs reliable access to dollar-denominated reserves and redemption. The same applies to euro, sterling or other fiat-backed tokens.

This creates an important limitation to the idea of fully independent payment networks.

The transfer layer may become decentralised or geographically distributed.

The value layer remains anchored somewhere.

Businesses therefore need to understand not only which blockchain carries a token, but also:

• who issues it;
• what legally backs it;
• where the backing assets are held;
• who controls redemption;
• where liquidity is available;
• which legal jurisdictions apply;
• whether critical entities are sanctioned or otherwise restricted.

The blockchain address is only the visible end of a much larger institutional structure.

Non-dollar stablecoins have a different strategic role

Dollar-backed stablecoins continue to dominate digital-asset liquidity, but the A7A5 development illustrates why other currencies may still produce meaningful stablecoin use cases.

A non-dollar stablecoin does not necessarily need to challenge USDC or USDT globally.

It can become useful inside a particular trade corridor.

Businesses trading primarily between two regions may value a digital settlement instrument if it reduces unnecessary currency conversions, supports continuous liquidity or provides access where existing correspondent relationships are inefficient.

This creates the possibility of a more fragmented stablecoin market.

Rather than one universal token replacing international banking, there could be multiple networks organised around currencies, jurisdictions, industries or trading relationships.

Dollar stablecoins could remain dominant globally while euro, dirham, yuan, ruble and other digital instruments develop specialised regional roles.

The economic question then becomes interoperability.

How easily can value move between these networks without recreating the same complexity that stablecoins were supposed to remove?

Parallel rails can create parallel liquidity

Payment infrastructure benefits enormously from network effects.

The more institutions using the same rail, currency and settlement standard, the easier it becomes to find liquidity and counterparties.

Fragmentation can weaken those benefits.

Imagine a world with multiple stablecoins for different currencies, several blockchain networks, bank-issued tokenised deposits, CBDCs and conventional payment rails operating simultaneously.

Businesses gain optionality, but treasury operations become more complicated.

Liquidity may become distributed across several instruments. Conversion costs can appear between networks. Compliance requirements may differ by provider and jurisdiction. Reconciliation becomes harder when the same commercial relationship can settle through several forms of money.

This is why interoperability matters as much as issuance.

Creating another digital token is relatively easy.

Building reliable liquidity, redemption, compliance and integration around it is much harder.

Stablecoins are becoming part of financial geopolitics

The A7A5 story also shows that payment technology cannot be separated completely from geopolitics.

Financial infrastructure has always carried strategic importance. SWIFT connectivity, correspondent banking, access to reserve currencies and international clearing systems influence how easily governments and businesses can participate in global commerce.

Digital money introduces new options.

Stablecoins can potentially allow participants to construct settlement arrangements that depend less heavily on some traditional intermediaries. CBDCs and interconnected domestic instant-payment systems may provide additional alternatives.

That does not mean the global financial system is about to fragment into isolated blockchain networks.

Traditional banking still processes vastly greater volumes, provides essential credit and liquidity services, and remains deeply integrated into international commerce.

But stablecoins lower the technological barrier to experimenting with parallel structures.

The A7A5 numbers demonstrate that those experiments can reach meaningful scale under the right economic and political conditions.

What businesses should take from this

For legitimate businesses considering stablecoin settlement, the lesson is not that stablecoins provide a way around financial restrictions.

The lesson is almost the opposite.

As stablecoin ecosystems become more varied, counterparty and infrastructure due diligence becomes more important.

A business should understand the complete settlement chain before accepting or sending a stablecoin:

Who issues the token? Where are the reserves? Which entities provide liquidity? Which exchange or custodian is involved? Can the token be redeemed reliably? Are any participants subject to sanctions? Which jurisdictions govern the transaction? Can the finance team explain the economic purpose and counterparties behind the movement?

These questions become especially important in cross-border B2B payments.

A recognised ticker and a stable market price are not sufficient.

The institutional structure behind the token matters.

The real stablecoin market may be multi-rail

Stablecoins were once presented as a replacement for slow banking infrastructure.

The market developing today looks more complicated.

Stablecoins are increasingly likely to coexist with instant payment systems, correspondent banking, tokenised deposits, CBDCs and conventional card and account-to-account networks.

Different rails will solve different problems.

A regulated dollar stablecoin may work well for digital commerce or global treasury. A bank tokenised deposit may be preferable for institutional settlement. A CBDC may support sovereign payment objectives. A local stablecoin may emerge around particular trade corridors.

The important capability for businesses will therefore not necessarily be choosing one permanent rail.

It will be understanding when each rail is appropriate and maintaining enough visibility to operate across them safely.

MetaNord’s view

At MetaNord, we see the A7A5 development as an important reminder that stablecoins are no longer only a crypto-market instrument.

They are becoming part of the architecture through which governments, banks and businesses think about cross-border settlement.

That creates opportunity, but also a much more demanding operating environment.

Fast settlement does not remove counterparty risk. Blockchain transparency does not replace customer due diligence. A functioning token does not guarantee lawful access to the institutions behind it.

For businesses, the relevant question is therefore not simply whether a stablecoin can move value across borders.

It is whether the entire settlement chain can be understood, controlled, reconciled and used within the applicable legal framework.

The technology can make the rail global.

The obligations around it remain very real.